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Abstract The Hanford Advisory Board (HAB) is a broadly
representative, deliberative body that provides formal policy
advice on Department of Energy (DOE) proposals and deci-
sions at the Hanford nuclear cleanup site near Richland,
Washington. Despite considerable skepticism about the effec-
tiveness of citizen advisory boards, we contend that the HAB
offers promising institutional innovations. Drawing on our
analysis of the HAB’s formal advice as well as our interviews
with board members and agency officials, we explore the
HAB’s unique design, outline a normative framework for eval-
uating participatory institutions, and assess the HAB’s effec-
tiveness in rendering the DOE accountable to the local public.
Keywords Bureaucracy . Deliberative democracy . Hanford
Advisory Board . Participatory democracy . Technology
Highly technical policy decisions present daunting challenges
for democracy, for two reasons. First, their sheer complexity
makes them difficult for even informed citizens to understand;
second, these decisions are often entrusted to bureaucracies
whose officials are not directly accountable to citizens and
whose deliberations are often hidden from public view. In
order to render government accountable to the public, citizens
must be able to see how policy decisions stand to affect their
interests and to understand—broadly speaking—the range of
available policy alternatives. When they are unable to do so,
for either of the two reasons just cited, they find themselves
exposed to the discretionary power of bureaucrats, scientists,
or policy experts. One of the major tasks of empirically
informed democratic theory is to analyze and evaluate prac-
tices and institutions that use public participation to try to
render highly technical public decision-making more trans-
parent and accountable to the public, and therefore more
legitimate (Fischer 2009; Dietz and Stern 2008; Fung and
Wright 2003; Kleinman 2000; Dryzek 2010; Fishkin 2011).
This paper investigates one such institution: the Hanford
Advisory Board (HAB), a broadly representative, deliberative
body that provides formal, policy advice on Department of
Energy (DOE) proposals and decisions at the Hanford nuclear
cleanup site near Richland, Washington. Critics have
expressed considerable skepticism about citizen advisory
boards as instruments of democratic accountability; they have
criticized their lack of independence, their lack of formal
power, and their failure to adequately represent affected
groups (Laurian 2007; Arnstein 1969; Vari 1995; Lynn and
Kartez 1995; Santos and Chess 2003). We use these concerns
to frame our central research questions: Does the HAB pro-
vide effective democratic oversight and accountability at the
Hanford nuclear cleanup site? If so, what specific features of
the HAB enable it to serve these democratic purposes? And,
more broadly, what lessons can its successes (and limitations)
teach us about rendering technical, bureaucratic decision-
making more accountable to the public?
We argue that the HAB serves important democratic func-
tions at Hanford. First, it produces and disseminates high-
quality, accessible public information that helps affected citi-
zens understand and defend their interests. Second, it repre-
sents affected constituencies’ concerns to the DOE and pres-
sures the DOE—successfully, in some cases—to frame clean-
up policies that better protect public interests. We argue,
moreover, that the HAB is able to perform these functions in
virtue of several promising innovations that set it apart from
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other comparable institutions. These features contain impor-
tant lessons for the design and improvement of other small-
scale, participatory bodies—especially in technical, bureau-
cratic settings.
THEORY
Before introducing and evaluating the HAB, wemust consider
the normative justifications for public participation in highly
technical, bureaucratic settings. These justifications fall into
three broad categories, which we call epistemic, political, and
instrumental. In this section, we focus especially on the sec-
ond category, which we find most relevant to the circum-
stances at Hanford. In doing so, we draw attention to one of
the most important normative problems that participation at
Hanford can help mitigate: the persistent problem of bureau-
cratic domination.
We follow the National Research Council in adopting
Daniel Fiorino’s three categories of justification for citizen
participation (Stern and Fineberg 1996, 23). The first he calls
“substantive,” though we will call it epistemic (Fiorino 1990,
227). Justifications in this category hold that agency decisions
will be better informed if citizens are allowed to participate in
their framing. The central insight here is that citizens can bring
important information to the table—especially about local
values and interests, and the way they stand to be affected
by agency decisions (Wagle 2000; Brown and Mikkelsen
1990). Such information can help well-intentioned
policymakers achieve a more accurate understanding of the
costs and benefits associated with particular rules or policies.
Fiorino calls his second category “normative.”
Justifications in this category hold that strictly technocratic
decision-making, without citizen input, is morally suspect.
Fiorino frames this category using democratic criteria: “a
technocratic orientation,” he suggests, “is incompatible with
democratic ideals” (Fiorino 1990, 227). We find it helpful to
describe this as the political justification for public participa-
tion. The central insight here is that agency officials some-
times pursue agendas that conflict with the interests and values
of affected citizens. Participation can be a way for citizens to
defend their interests and values and try to compel govern-
ment agencies to be responsive to them. The political justifi-
cation of participation supposes that agency decisions will
often be both more legitimate and more just if citizens are
able to defend their interests against government abuse or
neglect. These first two justifications correspond to two dif-
ferent styles of participation; the epistemic justification might
be described as consensual, the political justification as
adversarial.
The final category of justification is instrumental. In this
instance, participation is considered valuable because it en-
ables the agencies to achieve their own goals more efficiently
(Fiorino 1990, 228). These justifications, which abound in the
DOE’s own literature, stress the importance of winning over
the local population, of making agency decisions appear
legitimate to those affected by them, and of preempting ran-
corous opposition and costly lawsuits which prevent govern-
ment agencies from implementing their programs successfully
(Coglianese 1997; Hanford Public Involvement Plan 2012).
Each of these three categories of justification corresponds
to a different kind of problem that might afflict technocratic
decision-making. First, a decision might be (relatively) inac-
curate—either scientifically or in its grasp of the affected
population’s interests—and so impose unnecessary costs on
either the government itself or on the affected population.
Second, it might be illegitimate or unjust. Third, its imple-
mentation might be inefficient. Whereas the first and third
problems are well-recognized in the official literature associ-
ated with the Hanford cleanup, the second problem—and the
corresponding political category of justification—is substan-
tially underdeveloped.
In our view, however, the second problem is the most
important at Hanford and other sites with similar histories of
government misconduct. The Hanford cleanup is especially
vulnerable to a danger we call bureaucratic domination,
which undermines the legitimacy of its decisions.
Bureaucratic domination is a danger in any modern society
with a well-institutionalized bureaucracy. The problem arises
when bureaucracies amass substantial discretionary power,
which is not adequately constrained by the interests of those
affected by it. As Henry Richardson has emphasized, such
power can arise within otherwise legitimate democracies
(Richardson 2002, 4). He also argues that legislative oversight
is typically not enough to rein in administrative discretion:
somemeasure of participation by affected communities is also
often necessary (219–222).
Bureaucracies form an essential part of legitimate, demo-
cratic governance in the modern world. They are indispens-
able to the rule of law, with its demand for “abstract regularity
of the execution of authority” (Weber 1968, 983; c.f.
Richardson 2002, 10); they also enable governments to bring
important technical expertise to bear on difficult policy ques-
tions (10). Abstract regularity and the impartial application of
public rules are themselves defenses against the arbitrary
discretion of public officials. For these reasons, bureaucracies
are, as Richardson puts it, “necessary means to the legitimate
exercise of power” (10). However, bureaucrats can themselves
accumulate tremendous power without direct accountability
to the public. State and federal agencies’ increasing reliance
on private contractors to handle key responsibilities only
heightens this danger by interposing another layer of powerful
agents (in this case, private corporations), with their own
interests, between the public and the work being done on its
behalf. Any fully adequate democratic theory must therefore
address the problem of constraining bureaucratic discretion.
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Bureaucratic domination is a central problem that has
plagued the Hanford site from the beginning and contributed
to a chronic neglect of public safety. The US Department of
Defense was spectacularly delinquent in attending to the in-
terests of the local population (not just in the Hanford area, but
throughout the Northwest). The litany of negligent decisions
is well-known: the release of iodine-131 and other radioactive
materials into the air between 1944 and 1957 despite docu-
mented knowledge of the risk of thyroid disease (DeJure
2003), the failure to warn Hanford employees of the risk of
exposure to radioactive particles (Gerber 2007, 208), the
knowledge of and failure to remedy high-level leakage from
tanks into the groundwater (166), and the repeated violation of
environmental law and suppression of whistleblowers
(D’Antonio 1993). For the first 40-plus years of its operation,
moreover, the shroud of secrecy that surrounded the nuclear
facility prevented any effective oversight by local citizens or
officials.
Even since 1989 when the EPA and Washington State
Department of Ecology joined the DOE in managing the
cleanup, the site has been plagued by scandals involving the
safety culture of facilities and the adequacy of the cleanup
strategies and technologies (HAB Advice #258). The most
recent of these, which broke in early 2012, has raised serious
questions about whether the principal subcontractor, Bechtel
Corporation, is attending adequately to the long-term safety of
several key facilities (Eisler 2012 and HAB Advice #259).
Much of the misconduct illustrated at Hanford involves ex-
cessive bureaucratic discretion. The disastrous (and secret)
handling of highly toxic waste over the years illustrates this
excess all too plainly. The point here is not that agency
officials are or have been malevolent. Rather, their pursuit of
(often legitimate) agency objectives has not been adequately
constrained by the interests of the local populations whose
lives they have affected. Given this history, any effort to
redesign the decision-making process at Hanford ought to be
formulated with this problem squarely in view.
Focusing on the dangers of bureaucratic domination helps
clarify the role that public participation should play in contexts
such as the Hanford cleanup. Bureaucracies pose serious
obstacles to public oversight, and these obstacles give rise to
the power to dominate. The obstacles are both political and
epistemic. First, bureaucrats are not directly answerable to the
affected publics or even, in many cases, to their elected
representatives. Second, even where channels of accountabil-
ity exist, asymmetries of information between bureaucrats,
specialists, representatives, and the general public can make
democratic oversight very difficult. Bureaucrats with special-
ized knowledge can prevent relevant issues from being known
to the public or can misrepresent issues through acts of omis-
sion and distortion.
Too often, official discussions of the epistemic benefits of
public participation imagine that these benefits flow in one
direction only: members of the public are thought to provide
local information that is not easily accessible to agencies or to
identify local values that policy-makers can use to design
policies that reflect their interests accurately. This view as-
sumes, by and large, that government agencies are benign. It
also neglects the flow of information in the opposite direction:
in fact, participation also serves the important function of
providing the public with the information that it needs to hold
public officials accountable (Wagle 2000).
In order to counteract bureaucratic domination, participa-
tory institutions must enable citizens (1) to develop the capac-
ity to evaluate agency agendas and policies and (2) to chal-
lenge these agendas and policies if they diverge too far from
their interests. Such challenges can be pursued through vari-
ous means—through public protest, interest-group politics, or
legal challenge, for instance. Nonetheless, meaningful partic-
ipation must give participants some means of influencing
decision-making if it is to avoid serving as a rubber stamp
for preexisting agency decisions.
To relate this discussion to our earlier justificatory catego-
ries: the flow of information from citizens to bureaucrats can
help improve the quality of agency decision-making (espe-
cially when the relevant agency is trying in good faith to take
affected citizens’ interests and values into account). This is
what we are calling the strictly epistemic justification of public
participation; it presupposes no fundamental conflict of inter-
est between bureaucrats and the affected public and so raises
no deep normative controversies. On the other hand, the flow
of information from bureaucrats to citizens can enable citizens
to understand when (and in what ways) agencies do not have
their interests at heart and can enable them to act politically to
defend themselves. This is what we are calling the political
justification of public participation (though it has an obvious
epistemic dimension as well).
Participatory institutions designed with strictly epistemic
justifications in mind will fail to address the danger of bureau-
cratic domination. The epistemic justification does not require
that such institutions have any political power to challenge the
public agencies they are informing. As we argue later, political
power—albeit quite limited—is a significant part of the story
of the HAB’s relative success. Moreover, if agencies’ domi-
nant motives are instrumental, and if they design citizen
participation largely with these motives in mind, then partic-
ipatory institutions might simply serve the purpose of lending
a veneer of public legitimacy to agency decisions—regardless
of whether these decisions are normatively sound. Lynn and
Kartez argue, in fact, that this has been one of the central
functions of citizen advisory committees: “to rationalize
established power through some degree of shared gover-
nance,” or the appearance thereof (Lynn and Kartez 1995,
90). They argue that such committees, because they are
commissioned and influenced by agency officials, tend to
develop a “bias toward upholding the [agency’s] goals” (90).
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There is danger, in other words, that such committees can
worsen the normative problem by pre-empting popular resis-
tance to unjust or illegitimate agency decisions and thereby
exacerbating bureaucratic domination.
METHODOLOGY
In determining whether (and to what extent) the HAB pro-
vides effective democratic oversight at Hanford, we faced two
separate tasks. The first was to understand the internal opera-
tion of the HAB itself: the formal and informal processes by
which deliberations were held and decisions made. The sec-
ond was to understand the nature and extent of the HAB’s
influence over DOE decision-making. We began by canvas-
sing the available literature and formal documentation
pertaining to the HAB; we also attended and observed the
HAB’s meetings on two separate occasions.
We turned to interviews, however, as the centerpiece of our
research approach to both key tasks. We conducted 17 un-
structured interviews with people directly involved (or recent-
ly involved) with the HAB.1 We chose our interviewees using
two criteria: we wanted a wide variety of different perspec-
tives, and we wanted people with extensive knowledge of the
HAB’s activities over several years. We began by identifying
HABmembers who occupy positions of responsibility—com-
mittee chairpersons, for example—and then used our inter-
views with them to identify other knowledgeable participants,
including the public officials who have worked closely with
the Board for some time. This process enabled us to assemble
a diverse and knowledgeable group of interviewees, including
officials from the DOE, EPA, and Washington Ecology; long-
standing HAB members representing environmental and
worker groups; a local government representative and
longstanding HAB member; and a reporter with extensive
experience covering Hanford (Appendix 1). Interviews were
conducted between March and October of 2012; they typical-
ly lasted between an hour and an hour-and-a-half, though
some were shorter.
In each of our interviews, we began with questions about
the HAB’s internal operation: Who participates? How are
decisions made? How is disagreement handled? We asked
our interviewees to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses
of the HAB’s deliberative procedures and informal
rules. We then asked for specific examples to illustrate
either the presence or absence of HAB influence on
DOE policy. When interviewees identified areas of
HAB influence, we pressed them to reflect on the mecha-
nisms that make this influence possible. We also asked
interviewees to address the concern that advisory boards are
often ineffective or “captured” by agencies.
In order to deepen our understanding of the nature and
extent of the HAB’s influence over DOE decision-making,
we also reviewed 5 years of formal HAB advice, which offers
specific policy recommendations to the DOE (Appendix 2).
The formal advice is spelled out in letters written by the HAB
to the DOE. Each letter might contain anywhere from one to
over 20 specific recommendations. This advice is available to
the public, as are the formal responses written by the DOE.We
coded agency responses to each specific HAB recommenda-
tion using the following categories: no response, disagree,
disagree (already done), agree (general), agree to change,
agree (already doing), will consider, mixed, and unclear. The
categories of no response, disagree, will consider, and unclear
are straightforward, but our evaluation suggested the need for
a more nuanced taxonomy to better capture the nature of
agency responses.
Disagree (already done) indicates that the DOE believes
that it has already fulfilled the HAB’s recommendations, and
that it found no need to change its (past or present) course of
action. This category usually indicates that the HAB and DOE
interpret agency actions differently. For example, HAB
Advice #246 on the River Corridor Baseline Risk
Assessment recommends that the DOE use a different risk-
assessment methodology; in response, DOE rejects this advice
on the grounds that its methodology already addresses the
Board’s concerns. In contrast, agree (already doing) de-
scribes instances in which the DOE agrees that a change
was required (to some previous policy or course of action),
but claims to have made the change already. In some such
cases, the DOE response draws attention to actions that the
HAB may have overlooked or actions that were taken
while HAB advice was being discussed or issued.
Responses were coded mixed when the DOE responded
with a combination of willingness to consider HAB advice
and dissention. “Agree (general)” means that the DOE
expressed general, often vaguely worded, agreement with
the HAB’s criticisms or recommendations, but without
signaling any clear intention to change course. Finally,
agree to change indicates a clear intention on the DOE’s
part to modify its behavior to comply with board advice.
This is the only category that indicates direct HAB influ-
ence on policy.
THE HAB: HISTORYAND INTERNAL STRUCTURE
The Hanford site was chosen as part of the Manhattan Project
to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons under the War
Powers Act. Hanford was selected because of its relative
isolation, its proximity to a dependable source of power, and
its access to the Columbia River’s water to cool the reactors. In
1 Two of these interviews were with the same interviewee (we conducted
an original and a follow-up interview); so we have 16 distinct
interviewees.
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1944, the B Reactor—the world’s first full-scale plutonium
reactor—began producing plutonium for the “Fat Man”
bomb dropped on Nagasaki. In the next 11 years, the
Atomic Energy Commission added seven more reactors that
produced most of the plutonium for the USA’s nuclear arsenal
for over 40 years.
Not until recent decades did the Hanford site become an
object of public scrutiny. The Atomic Energy Commission
operated Hanford under a mandate of state secrecy from 1947
until 1977 when the Department of Energy took control. A
strict policy of secrecy continued until 1986, when in response
to public pressure, the DOE released 19,000 pages of docu-
ments about Hanford (Gerber 2007, 201). The documents
revealed extensive environmental damage to soil and ground-
water and the Atomic Energy Commission’s extraordinary
neglect of public safety.
In 1989, Hanford officially ceased producing plutonium
and began focusing on cleanup and waste disposal. With nine
decommissioned reactors, the site was immediately recog-
nized as the largest nuclear waste site in the United States,
containing millions of gallons of highly radioactive waste,
multiple toxic groundwater plumes, large amounts of trans-
uranic elements, and square miles of toxic landfill. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added Hanford to
its Superfund National Priorities list and in May of 1989, the
US Department of Energy, the EPA, and Washington State
signed the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA), formerly titled the
Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.
The Tri-Party Agreement defined the agencies’ priorities and
responsibilities in managing the cleanup effort and bringing
the site into full compliance with environmental laws, notably
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (1976). Both of
these laws contain a legal mandate for public participation;
to satisfy these mandates, the agencies have pursued several
different strategies, but the centerpiece has been the Hanford
Advisory Board.
The HAB is one of eight DOE advisory boards
(called “Site-Specific Advisory Boards,” or SSABs)
created to facilitate stakeholder advice and recommen-
dations on cleanup decisions (Convening Report, 1993).
HAB members review and comment on all aspects of
the cleanup, including, but not limited to, scientific risk
assessments, the adequacy of cleanup technologies, the
DOE’s budget and schedule, the structure of DOE’s
contracts with subcontracting firms, the DOE’s rela-
tionship with employees and employee unions, and
the Tri-Party Agencies’ public outreach. HAB meetings are
open to members of the public and comments are on the
record.
Though formally created in 1994, the Hanford Advisory
Board stems from a 1991 Office of Technology Assessment
report (the FFERDC Interim Report) that identified “public
skepticism of the DOE’s decision-making process”
(Convening Report, 1993, 3) as an obstacle to the cleanup. It
recommended citizen advisory boards as a way of addressing
this skepticism. In response to the report, the DOE formed the
“Hanford Future Site Uses Working Group” that included
many of the stakeholders that would later form the HAB
(Gerber 2007, 268). The initial plan for the HAB’s design was
drafted by the Keystone Center, a non-profit conflict manage-
ment group that was asked to convene and oversee discussions
among important stakeholders in the Hanford region.
The HAB was the first advisory board created by the DOE,
and to this day it retains a unique structure that differentiates it
from the seven others. To outline this structure and situate the
HAB in the landscape of small-scale participatory democratic
institutions, we draw on a taxonomy developed by Archon
Fung. Fung classifies public participation along three dimen-
sions: scope of participation, mode of communication and
decision, and extent of authority (Fung 2006; c.f. Dietz and
Stern 2008, 14–18). He asks three corresponding questions of
participatory institutions: “Who participates? How do they
communicate and make decisions? What is the connection
between their conclusions and opinions on one hand and
public policy and action on the other?” (Fung 2006, 67).2
Each of these questions can be used to clarify important
design features of the HAB.
Who Participates?
There are currently 37 members of the HAB (and one seat
remains vacant). Five of those members represent the state and
federal bureaucracies involved in the Hanford cleanup: the
DOE (two seats), EPA, Washington State Department of
Ecology, and Washington State Department of Health. The
other participants represent different, overlapping local and
regional constituencies (see Table 1). With the exception of
the “public at large” representatives, each of the members is
supposed to be answerable to the specific constituencies he or
she represents and to “consult with these entities and constit-
uencies on a regular basis” (Operating Ground Rules).
Each of the constituencies identified by Keystone’s
Convening Report was originally asked to nominate its own
candidates for the Board. And when a seat is vacated,
the Board is directed to consult with the relevant con-
stituency and invite (no more than three) new nomina-
tions. The Tri-Party Agencies reserve the right to inter-
view and vet these nominees, who are then submitted to
DOE for final approval—so the agencies retain substantial
2 In our view, Fung’s theory is much more useful, concrete, and well-
tailored than Habermas’s ideal speech situation which has been used
repeatedly in empirical studies of citizen participation in the USA (and
especially in studies of citizen advisory boards); see for instance Santos
and Chess 2003; Webler 1995, and Vari 1995.
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discretionary control over the selection process (Memorandum
of Understanding). Our interviews indicate, however, that the
DOE does not generally exercise control over these appoint-
ments (Interviews C, G).3
Fung outlines several different ways of choosing participants
for a deliberative process or institution. The first and most
obvious is simply self-selection: meetings can be open to the
public, and anyone interested can participate. Though this meth-
od has an obvious intuitive appeal, Fung notes that its limitations
are also apparent: participants tend to be highly unrepresentative
of the population whose interests are at stake (Fung 2006, 67).
The group of participants can be made more representative
through either selective recruitment or random selection. And
selective recruitment can be guided by different goals: it can
choose lay participants or professional participants (who work
for government agencies or relevant non-profits) (Fung
2006, 67–68). It can also aim to render the institution
more representative or simply more diverse. The goal of
(descriptive) representativeness and diversity often pull
in different directions, since the affected population may
not itself be highly diverse.
The HAB combines these several possibilities. Seats on the
board are deliberately allocated to certain groups. Moreover,
broader public participation in the HAB’s meetings is fairly
limited. Members of the public must sit in the “galley” behind
the main discussion table, and are invited to make comments
only during a few brief public comment periods, typically at
the end of HAB discussions. A 1999 evaluation of the HAB
found, for instance, that HAB meetings “are not structured to
facilitate public engagement” and “are generally not well
attended by the public” (Bradbury and Branch 1999, 10).
Our own observations confirmed that these findings still hold.
The Keystone Center’s report invokes the principle of
affected interests as the rationale for the HAB’s particular
allocation of seats. After conducting interviews with local
citizens and interest groups, Keystone identified these differ-
ent constituencies as having a “clearly definable stake” in the
outcome of the Hanford cleanup (Convening Report
1993, 12). Much of the Keystone Center’s analysis is
focused on delineating the discrete interests of these
several affected constituencies. For instance, the state of
Oregon has an interest in the cleanup because the Columbia
River is threatened with contamination. The Keystone report
does not, however, explain why certain groups are allocated
more seats than others, and how the numbers of seats were
determined.
How do Participants Communicate and Make Decisions?
The Board’s communications and meetings are deliberative
and participatory, in the sense that Board members are not
merely passive spectators, but rather set the meeting agendas
themselves. The Convening Report and the Operating Rules
insist that Tri-Party agencies “not attempt to control the rec-
ommendations of the Board.”
Board members deliberate with the agency representatives,
and with one another. All members are entitled to speak, and
many do. The Board is also divided into five different com-
mittees with specific responsibilities that meet separately (in
addition to the joint meetings of the HAB) to allow for more
detailed and more exploratory conversations.4 Bradbury and
Branch observe that “the committees frame issues, gather
information, provide progress reports to the board, and devel-
op draft recommendations, which they bring to the full board”
for discussion (6). Tri-party officials also attend these
meetings.
Members of the board often bring policy, scientific, and
engineering expertise to the table through their experiences as
research scientists, workers at the Hanford facility, or em-
ployees of environmental groups, and they typically serve
on the board for years at a time. As a result, they tend to
become familiar with agency jargon and scientific terminolo-
gy. As a group, they are unlikely to be intimidated by technical
discussions or cowed by bureaucratic specialists (Interviews
C, G, J). This is significant from a democratic point of view:
citizens’ inability to understand technical policy discussions
can be a substantial barrier to effective participation (Lynn and
Kartez 1995, 98).
The board is committed to making its key decisions—
concerning “major policy issues” and “major procedural”
questions—by consensus. The board’s Operating Ground
3 One interviewee mentioned that the DOE did recently select two mem-
bers from a pool of 19 applicants for “Public-at-Large” seats on the HAB
without discussion or explanation to the HAB (Interview I). It is signif-
icant that this occurred for these at-large seats rather than seats
representing specific constituencies—the constituencies have been more
successful in choosing their own representatives.
4 Currently the operating committees are: Budgets and Contracts; Health,
Safety, and Environmental Protection; Public Involvement and
Communication; River and Plateau; and Tank Waste.
Table 1 Hanford Advisory Board Membership
Local government interests (7)
Local business interests (1)
Hanford work force (5)
Local environmental interests (1)
Regional citizen, environmental, and public interest organizations (5)
Local and regional public health (2)
Tribal government (3)
State of Oregon (2)
Universities (2)
Public at large (4)
Liaison representatives (5)
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Rules stipulate, however, that there are several different
“levels” of consensus, ranging from full consensus to in-
stances in which some board members dissent from but can
still “live with” majority recommendations, to instances in
which dissenters, despite their stronger reservations, do not
wish to “block” the Board’s decision (Operating Ground
Rules). In cases of still sharper disagreement, the Board is
also entitled to write majority and minority opinions, though
this very rarely occurs in the Board’s formal advice. The
Board’s commitment to decision-making by consensus is
sometimes framed as a commitment to inclusion and a way
of preventing the discussion from becoming either too tech-
nical or too partisan (Bradbury and Branch 1999, 8).
Among groups that deliberate actively (rather than passive-
ly absorbing information), Fung draws a distinction between
two styles of discussion: aggregation and bargaining and
deliberation and negotiation. In the first style, writes Fung,
“participants know what they want, and the mode of decision-
making aggregates their preferences—often mediated by the
influence and power that they bring—into a social choice”
(Fung 2006, 68). Deliberation and negotiation, on the other
hand, describes a process through which participants shape
their own opinions through an exchange of “perspectives,
experiences, and reasons” with the ultimate goal of reaching
mutual agreement (69). The Board’s commitment to (some
form of) consensus, as well as the general culture of the HAB,
renders the style of deliberation much closer to deliberation
and negotiation. Board members know that theymust domore
than win over a faction of similarly disposed colleagues;
they have to find common ground, and to do so they
have to try to understand and engage with all of their
colleagues’ points of view (Interviews C, K). With its
combination of stakeholder representation and consensus-
oriented deliberation, the HAB thus presents a distinctive
blend of deliberative and “pluralist” design features
(Huitema, van de Kerkhof, and Pesch 2007).
Finally, Fung distinguishes a third discursive style, which
he calls technical expertise. This kind of discussion typically
aims to solve concrete, technical problems and is dominated
by trained experts. “This mode,” writes Fung, “does not
typically involve citizens” (69). Part of what makes the
HAB so interesting is that it seeks to involve citizens in
precisely these sorts of technical discussions. The board’s
purpose is to provide policy-advice and this cannot be
accomplished without an in-depth understanding of the
technical issues (Interview A). The Board is routinely
called on to assess different cleanup strategies at the
Hanford site, to compare different cleanup technologies,
and to make judgments about the acceptable levels of risk
associated with each. In February 2012, for instance, the
Board’s agenda included a detailed review of the DOE’s plan
to clean up several contaminated sites near the Columbia
River (HAB Advice #257).
What Is the Connection Between HAB Conclusions
and Opinions and Public Policy and Action?
Fung outlines a range of possibilities concerning the power and
authority that participatory institutions command. Inmany cases,
participatory institutions have no power over public decisions,
but exist largely as a way of allowing citizens to become more
informed (Fung 2006, 69). In other cases, these institutions are
structured to provide some form of “communicative influence”
on public officials, either simply by helping officials understand
the experiences and interests of participants or by offering formal
advice (69). A third type of institution actually empowers par-
ticipants with some measure of decision-making power, either
through a “co-governing partnership” of some kind or through
direct authority over public decisions (69). New England town
meetings, for instance, serve as an example of direct authority:
whatever the assembled citizens decide becomes policy.
The HAB advises state and federal bureaucracies, but
commands no share of formal decision-making power. The
most explicit “outcome” of the HAB’s deliberation is the
formal advice that it delivers to the Tri-Party Agencies. Each
separate “piece” of advice is expressed in a published docu-
ment, often several pages long and sometimes including a
dozen or more specific recommendations. Since 1994, the
Board has produced 270 letters of advice covering a broad
range of issues from budgets and timetables to technical risk
assessments to the adequacy of the agencies’ plans to involve
and inform the broader public.
The Ground Rules and the Final Guidance stipulate that the
agencies should offer the Board “sufficient notice” about
impending decisions, so that it has time to review them and offer
advice. The agencies are also committed to responding inwriting
to the Board’s advice and senior agency officials are required to
attend HABmeetings. The HAB has no formal power, however,
to compel the Tri-Party Agencies to follow its advice. Its influ-
ence is “communicative,” and is expressed in the form of formal
and informal advice. We should add, however, that any full
assessment of an institution’s power must consider both direct
and indirect mechanisms. For instance, the Board could wield
indirect power by influencing the EPA and Washington State
Department of Ecology, both which have legal authority to
prevent or mandate certain actions. Or the Board might, simply
in virtue of the information it gathers about the Hanford cleanup
effort and the implicit threat that it could bring damaging or
incendiary information to the media, exercise some indirect
power over agency decision-making. We return to these ques-
tions later in our assessment.
THE HAB’S INFLUENCE
In this section, we discuss four channels through which the
HAB exerts influence over the DOE, and in each case we
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assess the nature and extent of this influence.5 The first mech-
anism is the HAB’s practice of providing formal, publicly
available advice to the DOE (to which the DOE is expected
to respond). The secondmechanism is media and constituency
pressure enabled by the HAB. The third mechanism is infor-
mal discussion between Board members and DOE staff, es-
pecially in the context of committee consultations. Finally,
EPA and the Washington Department of Ecology officials
may use HAB advice as a mechanism for leverage in their
negotiations with DOE or with their own supervisors. In our
view, this four-part assessment gives reason for a measured
optimism about the HAB’s capacity to render DOE more
accountable to the citizens it affects.
Formal Advice
Our review of DOE responses to the HAB’s formal advice
reveals that, in the vast majority of cases, the agency responses
simply explain (a) why the Board’s recommendations are not
possible, (b) why the DOE disagrees with the Board’s recom-
mendations, (c) that the DOE is already largely complying
with the Board’s recommendations, or (d) that the Board’s
advice will be taken into consideration at some later date. The
DOE very rarely expresses a firm commitment to abide by the
HAB’s advice. The DOE agreed to change its behavior in 4 %
of the cases, but this was usually to accommodate recommen-
dations for public involvement, an area that is ultimately
peripheral to the main business of cleaning up the waste
(e.g., HAB Advice #184 and DOE Response).
Thirty percent of the time, the DOE failed to respond to
specific points raised by the HAB. It disagreed with the HAB
in a further 16 % of the cases (this figure corresponds to the
categories “disagree” and “disagree, already done”). In many
of these cases, the DOE disputes the board’s technical analysis
and asserts that it has already taken the necessary measures to
meet its cleanup goals. Furthermore, the mere fact that the
DOE agrees with HAB does not necessarily indicate influence
as its agreement was vague or non-committal in many cases.
Our interviews suggest that these vague or non-committal
responses do not typically result in later compliance with the
HAB’s recommendations. We are not arguing that the DOE
should always implement the HAB’s advice. We are in no
position to adjudicate particular policy or technical disputes
between the HAB and the DOE. Our concern, rather, is that
the DOE’s formal responses often do not show evidence of
engagement and sustained dialogue and exhibit little evidence
of responsiveness to the public’s real and perceived needs and
interests. This problem has troubled Board members for some
time (Bradbury and Branch 1999, 11).
The story of the formal advice is not, however, entirely
negative. Even if the DOE does not directly change its policy
to take into account of HAB advice, the advice itself provides
an informational bulwark that can mitigate bureaucratic dom-
ination. The HAB is unique among Site-Specific Advisory
Boards in its ability to offer detailed, technical rebuttals to
Environmental Impact Statements and other highly technical
documents. For example, the HAB writes detailed assess-
ments of DOE documents such as the 6,000-page Tank
Closure and Waste Management Environmental Impact
Statement. Furthermore, the formal advice documents an on-
going discussion with the DOE about how to address leaking
tanks, plumes of waste contaminating the groundwater, work-
er health and safety, and other issues vital to the public
interest. This formal advice provides a valuable repository
for anyone looking for information about Hanford. The
HAB is not the only agency capable of this role—e.g., the
Oregon Department of Energy also provides expertise—but it
adds epistemic dimensions not offered by other agencies.
In fact, the HAB provides a compelling response to what
Alvin Goldman terms the “novice-expert problem” (Goldman
2001, 89). Novices who are unable to acquire technical ex-
pertise need criteria for identifying trustworthy experts. This
problem is particularly vexing when experts (or those identi-
fied as experts) disagree. One of HAB’s merits is the presence
of people with specialized technical backgrounds such as
former DOE engineers and academic scientists (the HAB
has been fortunate to attract and retain a number of highly
trained members). However, it is the presence of people
without an engineering or scientific background that prevents
the board becoming simply another technocratic group and
provides novices—as well as citizens at large and members of
the media—with a source of comprehensible and reliable
information. Technically oriented people from the Tri-Party
agencies and from the board need to explain their decisions in
language comprehensible to people without a background in
science and engineering. Furthermore, the HAB’s diversity
and its commitment to providing consensus advice help it
remain relatively unbiased as an institution. Formal advice
has gone through a rigorous vetting process and enjoys the
support—or at least not the opposition—of groups
representing environmental interests, workers, local busi-
nesses, tribes, and others.
Media and Constituency Pressure
Our interviewees identified relatively few examples where
formal HAB advice clearly caused a change in the DOE’s
5 In our usage, “influence” occurs when the following two conditions are
satisfied: (1) the DOE behaves differently than it would have absent the
HAB, and (2) the shift in the DOE’s behavior is congruent with the
HAB’s agenda. Such influence is easiest to see, of course, when the
DOE alters its course of action in response to HAB inputs. As our
discussion below illustrates, the HAB influences the DOE through formal
and informal channels by providing reasons, shaping incentives,
(implicitly) threatening popular resistance, and altering the terms of
inter-agency negotiation.
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decision-making. The case that our interviewees most fre-
quently mentioned was the HAB’s role in changing the safety
culture around beryllium contamination. This case provides
some optimism that the HAB can play a role in affecting DOE
policy; it also reveals the complexity of this role and shows
how it typically must combine with outside actors to be
effective.
Beryllium is a light metal frequently used in nuclear reac-
tors. In its natural form, it is present in low quantities or
trapped in rock and soil and does not pose a health risk, but
repeated exposure to beryllium dust in industrial settings can
lead to chronic beryllium disease. For some people, sensitiza-
tion to beryllium leads to an allergic reaction which causes
scarring of the lung tissue and increases risk of cancer and
possibly heart failure. On April 3, 2009, the HAB submitted
Consensus Advice #217 warning that the extent of beryllium
contamination might be greater than realized and that 42 % of
Hanford workers had been exposed to beryllium. “From a
worker safety perspective,” it states, “based on the number
of affected workers, beryllium currently rates as a greater
hazard than radiation.” The letter noted 27 verified cases of
chronic beryllium disease, including an employee who died of
lung cancer and another employee who now relies on oxygen
24 h a day. It also noted 88 confirmed cases of beryllium
sensitivity. The letter advocated testing of buildings where
beryllium was not thought to be present, the application of
an “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” philosophy to be-
ryllium, and the education of present and former workers
about the risks of beryllium and the areas of potential exposure
at Hanford. Consensus Advice #218, submitted the same day,
identified some of the obstacles that prevent sensitized
workers from receiving treatment, advocated for fair worker
compensation, and emphasized the need to evaluate workers
over their lifetimes as sensitivity can develop years or decades
after initial exposure. The DOE responded 5 months later with
a letter reiterating that its present safety rules “establish more
stringent safety and health requirements at Hanford than those
applied to work done in the private sector” and lauding the
“outstanding safety records at Hanford” (DOE Responses to
HAB Advice #217 and #218). The letter responded to the
HAB’s points by assuring that it had already met all reason-
able concerns about beryllium exposure.
The February 5, 2010 HAB Consensus Advice #228
expressed dismay that the DOE had not followed the recom-
mendations of two prior independent reviews and that it failed
to carry out an independent review of its beryllium program in
which workers would participate in selecting the review team
(HAB Advice #228). The DOE instead sought to review the
Chronic Beryllium Disease Program Plan using personnel
from DOE Headquarters. Finally, after local media began
covering the controversy, the DOE relented: in a letter dated
November 18, 2010, the DOE returned to the points raised by
the earlier HAB advice and provided a detailed response that
promised to meet many of the HAB’s concerns (DOE
Responses #217, 218, and 228, Interview B, E). At the end
of the process, the DOE ended up implementing most of the
HAB’s recommendations (Federal Register 2010).
The HAB’s role in protecting workers from chronic beryl-
lium disease is a story of mixed success. Several of our
interviewees noted that the process of creating HAB advice
can be frustratingly slow. Over a year elapsed between the
HAB’s initial advice and a productive response by the DOE.
The DOE’s initial response was defensive and it may be that
no significant change would have occurred if the issue had not
been picked up by the local media. Annette Cary, a reporter
from the Tri-City Herald who attended the Board meeting in
which concerns about beryllium were initially raised wrote a
series of articles from April 2009 to March 2011 that kept the
issue in the public eye. Her initial story on beryllium exposure
drew heavily on the HAB’s investigation. Given the local
interest in the protection of Hanford workers, the resulting
public outcry gave the DOE strong incentive to improve its
practices (Interview B). In this case, the HAB provided a
forum inwhich people with technical expertise and experience
with beryllium were able to raise concerns which were later
reiterated in independent scientific reviews.
The beryllium case offers an example of what we have
been calling the political function of public participation.
Through its formal advice, the HAB generated high-quality,
accessible public information about an ongoing injustice at the
Hanford site—information that was then used by media and
other public interest groups and members of the public
searching for an independent evaluation of DOE policy. The
HAB was instrumental, therefore, in mobilizing the affected
public to act in defense of its own interests. (The HAB’s
ability to generate vital public information for media and
activists is all the more important now that media companies
are devoting far fewer resources to investigative journalism.
Annette Cary, for instance, used to devote 30 h a week to the
Hanford site alone; budget cuts at the Tri-City Herald have
made this impossible, and in recent years she has relied more
heavily on information produced by the HAB (Interview
F)). Nor is the beryllium case unique: our interviewees
have pointed to several other cases, including the safety
culture at Bechtel, in which the Board’s objections to DOE
policy have drawn the attention of media and the broader
public (Interview G).
Several features of the HAB help it serve this political
function. First, as we mentioned before, HAB members tend
to serve long terms on the Board. Several Board members
have been active since the Board’s creation in the early 1990s,
and so have more experience and institutional memory than
most of the agency regulators. In fact, the HAB is the only one
of the Site-Specific Advisory Boards that does not have term
limits, andmany of the members we interviewed cited this as a
key precondition of the Board’s effectiveness (Interviews C,
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E, B, F, H). Several interviewees estimated that it takes 2 to
4 years for most new Board members—even highly educated
members—to become fully conversant in the technical vocab-
ularies used by agency officials and scientists or engineers
(Interviews E, B). Longer terms are therefore crucial in en-
abling the board to develop and retain the scientific and policy
knowledge needed to understand not only the DOE’s deci-
sions, but also the range of alternatives available to it well
enough to convey this information to the broader, affected
public and to make competent judgments and recommenda-
tions. Longer terms are also important in maintaining institu-
tional memory about a cleanup effort that will be ongoing for
generations.
Second, the HAB’s ability to serve its political function
also depends on its willingness and ability to attract attention
to potential injustices, both from media and from broader
public constituencies. On this score, we find that the HAB’s
record is mixed. On the one hand, the representative nature of
HAB seats facilitates this communication and mobilization.
On the other hand, our observations and interviews suggest
that the Board’s media and public outreach remains underde-
veloped. A number of interviewees thought that the Board
could do a better job of communicating with media and
mobilizing the broader public (Interviews E, I).
One of the impediments here is cultural: many Board
members are unwilling to adopt an adversarial relationship
to the DOE, largely because the communities they represent
are dependent on the DOE and its subcontractors for jobs and
economic prospects. In fact, several interviewees described a
notable “East–West” culture clash on the Board: members
representing the (Eastern) local Tri-City communities and
the Hanford workforce are largely pro-nuclear and want to
retain nuclear jobs in the area (Interviews E, D). Members
representing environmental agencies and other groups based
in Portland and Seattle tend to be anti-nuclear and to mistrust
the DOE and its subcontractors. This internal tension can
prevent the Board itself from voicing strong public criticisms
of the DOE. Even in the beryllium case, one of our inter-
viewees noted that the Board’s eventual action was largely the
result of the dogged determination of a single member, who
simply would not let the issue rest. We should add, however,
that several of our interviewees argued that the diversity and
inclusiveness of the Board, combined with the consensus
decision rule, makes the DOE much more likely to take its
recommendations seriously, since they do not simply express
the views of environmental activists (Interviews J, E, F).
Committee Consultations and Informal Discussion
We have argued that the HAB formal advice has an important
normative function that can translate into policy changes that
track the interests of stakeholders, especially when this advice
is used to mobilize media and segments of the broader,
affected public. Does the HAB exert a more direct influence
on the policies that govern the Hanford cleanup?
One way in which the HAB can exercise a more direct
influence on agency decision-making is through the Tri-Party
Agencies’ consultations with the five specialized HAB com-
mittees. Our informal conversations with board members and
regulators suggested that the HAB’s influence is most signif-
icant in the early stages of the DOE’s decision-making, when
DOE officials bring preliminary ideas and proposals to HAB
committee meetings and solicit committee feedback
(Interviews K, B, E). During these committee meetings, and
during the informal conversations that happen around the
committee meetings, information flows both ways: committee
members get an early look at the DOE’s plans, and regulators
get an early sense of the Board’s reaction to its proposals.
Several interviewees report that, if the committee response is
sharply negative, the DOE commonly adjusts its strategy in
response (Interview K, A). Indeed, they note a sharp contrast
between the DOE’s willingness to accommodate Board sug-
gestions at the committee level (and early in the decision-
making process), and its unwillingness to accommodate for-
mal advice, which is typically offered much later in the
process, after the DOE has formulated a concrete plan of
action (Interview E, C). As we mentioned earlier, one inter-
viewee noted that formal advice is often issued only in cases in
which no agreement could be reached at the committee level
(Interview C).
There are two ways of understanding the DOE’s incentives
for accommodating committee suggestions. First, regulators
use the HAB as a way of anticipating potential controversies
and public outcry (Interview M). One regulator described the
HAB as a “canary in the coal mine,” useful in helping regu-
lators anticipate and address important public concerns
(Interview L). Here again we see the HAB serving the political
function that we have discussed, though here it succeeds in
preempting public conflict altogether. Second, committee
feedback can serve the epistemic function by helping the
DOE formulate better policy in two respects: it can help
well-intentioned regulators understand the interests and
values of the affected populations more clearly, and so
to design policies that reflect these interests and values
more adequately; it can also contribute technical and scientific
information that improves the DOE’s procedures or standards
(Interview D).
The political function described here is linked to the
Board’s capacity to mobilize the media and public (which
we described in “Media and constituency pressure” section).
But it is also enabled by another crucial feature of the Board’s
design: its representative quality. The HAB’s composition is
unique among Site-Specific Advisory Board in allocating
seats to representatives of various stakeholding constituencies.
In the HAB, the DOE confronts not simply a motley group of
individual citizens, but rather a slate of representatives who
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report to a wide range of constituencies, including local
governments, state governments, tribes, unions, and advocacy
groups. This fact gives the HAB a certain democratic credi-
bility in the eyes of DOE officials: the DOE has good reason
to believe that the HAB’s responses to its early proposals will
in fact reflect the broader, affected public’s interests and
values (Interview D, B, J).6 The fact that the HAB speaks by
consensus only strengthens its credibility in this respect.
Moreover, the organizations represented on the HAB have
more resources and political clout than individuals, raising the
possibility of outside legal and political pressure on the DOE.
When committee members react very negatively to an early
DOE proposal, DOE officials have reason to anticipate public
controversy if they continue as proposed.
The HAB’s representative quality also enables it to serve
the first of the two epistemic functions that we just outlined.
Precisely because the HAB is broadly representative of the
affected public, well-intentioned agency officials have reason
to consult with it when they want to better understand the
interests and values of affected constituencies (Interview B,
L). When the DOE is motivated to be responsive to affected
citizens’ interests and values, these consultations can help
them achieve this end. The second, more technical epistemic
function is possible largely because of two features that we
identified earlier: the expertise and institutional memory the
Board members accumulate in virtue of their long terms in
office, and the Board’s good fortune in recruiting a number of
highly knowledgeable members. The HAB represents an im-
pressive repository of technical expertise, and to the extent
that DOE officials recognize it as such, they sometimes find
themselves disposed to listen to its technical or scientific
advice. (Our interviews with agency officials, however, sug-
gest that the agencies do not see technical advice as part of the
HAB’s mandate and that they are skeptical of the
HAB’s capacity to generate useful technical guidance)
(Interview D, J). Institutional memory is no less impor-
tant here: the fact that certain Board members have
long-standing experience with the Hanford site and can
draw attention, for instance, to specific problems and failures
that arose in the past gives regulators reason to pay attention
(Interviews K, O).
Our interviews also suggest that, in order to serve either of
these epistemic functions, the Board must not be perceived
(by the agencies) as a highly partisan or ideological body
(Interview K). Since the Board’s epistemic function depends
largely on the DOE’s willingness to look to it for help, this
function requires a certain level of DOE trust and confidence
in the Board. It is worth pointing out that this fact brings the
epistemic function of the Board in some tension with its
political function, which requires that Board members be
willing to take adversarial stances and publicly criticize the
DOE in some cases. Sharp public criticism and conflict can, of
course, erode the trust that the epistemic function requires.
(This, too, might explain why some Board members are
hesitant to criticize the DOE publicly; Board members’ desire
to feel like trusted epistemic partners can therefore compro-
mise their capacity to serve their political function.)
Two final points about the Board’s informal influence
should be stressed. First, one of our interviewees observed
that there is great value in simply ensuring that DOE officials
interact regularly with concerned members of the local com-
munity in informal and reasonably cordial settings (Interview
K). Repeated, informal interactions can bring familiarity and
mutual trust and create channels of communication and subtle
negotiation that would not otherwise exist. Second, some
interviewees note that the DOE’s receptiveness to HAB feed-
back has varied over time as particular DOE officials have
come and gone, and that it depends partly on the individual
DOE officials and their relationship to the Board (Interview
C). The success of deliberative democratic measures often
depends heavily on key actors’ willingness to engage in
dialogue (Johnson 2007).
Agency Leverage
The final, though by no means least important, form of HAB
influence occurs when agency officials use the Board’s rec-
ommendations (either formal or informal) to gain leverage in
inter- or intra-agency negotiations. First, some interviewees
observed that DOE itself is often divided, with local officials
resisting some of the imperatives handed down by the
Washington office (Interview H, E).7 Local officials can use
the HAB’s resistance to certain policies, for instance, to make
a stronger case for some alternative (Interview H). Similarly,
officials in the EPA or the Washington State Department of
Ecology can use the HAB’s views to support their own posi-
tion when trying to impose changes on the DOE (Interviews I,
K, J). In their negotiations with the DOE, officials from both
the EPA and the Washington Dept. of Ecology argue that they
have a specific mandate to heed the public’s voice—a man-
date which effectively constrains them not to ignore the HAB
(Interview A). Such arguments can be effective even without
the implicit threat of intra-agency lawsuits: the DOE does not
like to proceed without the support of the other agencies,
partly because of the heightened risk of public scrutiny and
criticism (Interview A).
Moreover, officials at both the Washington State Dept. of
Ecology and the EPA reported that their mandate to solicit and
heed the public’s voice comes from the top: fromOlympia and
6 One interviewee expressed skepticism, however, about the importance
of the Board’s representative quality (Interview G).
7 Indeed, the local DOE has had to defend the Board and its unusual
structure to Washington, D.C., DOE officials who would like it to more
closely resemble the other SSABs (Interview R).
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Washington, D.C. (Interviews A, M).8 And in contrast with
the strident and often ill-informed comments that they receive
during open public meetings, the HAB provides the agencies
with a version of the public voice that is sober, informed, and
broadly representative. Our interviewees at both the EPA and
the Washington Dept. of Ecology cite the HAB as a valuable
resource to them as they strive to meet their commitment to
public involvement.
These possible channels of influence highlight another
important way in which the Hanford site is unusual: at
Hanford, the DOE must work alongside EPA and the
Washington State Department of Ecology (all three of which
are parties to the Tri-Party Agreement). Officials from all three
agencies attend committee and Board meetings and both
receive and communicate information from the Board.
Board members and regulators who have experience at many
different DOE sites agreed that many of the DOE-
commissioned advisory boards fall victim to the danger of
simply affirming the agency’s goals (Interviews B, C, D).
However, the presence of the other two regulatory agencies
makes it much more difficult for DOE to “capture” the HAB
(Interview I) since citizens on the HAB are exposed to a range
of agency opinions and styles. EPA and the Washington State
Department of Ecology can (and do) suggest points of view or
courses of action or investigation that run counter to what
DOE officials see in their agencies (Interview A, J). All
in all, this diversity of agencies reduces the probability
of bureaucratic domination, especially when it is joined
with a participatory institution such as the HAB. It may
be true, of course, that the involvement of several agen-
cies renders the cleanup effort more cumbersome and ineffi-
cient. But where one agency has a history of chronic abuse
and mismanagement, it is important that its discretion be
constrained by other powerful government agents who oper-
ate under different incentives.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we find that the HAB plays an important role in
rendering the DOE’s decision-making at Hanford more legit-
imate and in reducing the extent and probability of bureau-
cratic domination. It does so by helping make the DOE more
accountable to the population it affects. By and large,
the DOE wants to avoid public controversy, and it relies (in
part) on the HAB to help it do so. As we have through-
out the paper, we highlight the political function of the
HAB, which we believe to be unique among DOE site-
specific advisory boards (SSABs). In our view, the HAB’s
moderate successes can provide important lessons for the
design and improvement of other small-scale participatory
institutions—especially in technical, bureaucratic settings.
Two Democratic Functions
In facilitating informed public resistance and in helping the
DOE avoid it, the HAB serves an essentially dual democratic
role, both parts of which contribute to public accountability at
Hanford:
Producing and disseminating high-quality, accessible
information: In several different ways, the HAB helps
the public form a clearer conception of its own interests
and policy preferences at Hanford. It does this mainly by
generating and disseminating high-quality, detailed infor-
mation about key decisions under consideration by public
officials at Hanford, presented in terms that stakeholders
and journalists can understand. In doing so, it addresses
an important democratic deficit and heightens the proba-
bility that the public will understand and resist DOE
policies that threaten its interests.
Influencing the DOE to address constituency interests in
its practices and policies: The HAB often communicates
public interests and preferences to the DOE clearly and
early enough in the policy process to make a difference.
With the HAB’s help, the DOE can better anticipate and
avoid the very informed public resistance that the HAB
itself facilitates. The DOE does so, in some cases, by
adjusting its policy decisions to make them more congru-
ent with the affected public’s interests and preferences.
Because of the HAB’s first function, moreover, the DOE
is less able to avoid public controversy through obfusca-
tion or secrecy: this second role gains substantial demo-
cratic value, therefore, in light of the first.
Key Design Features
Several features of the HAB stand out as especially important in
enabling these two democratic functions. The first, second, and
fourth features listed below distinguish the HAB from the other
site-specific advisory boards commissioned by the DOE.
No term limits Since it takes citizens so long (2 to 4 years,
according to one interviewee) to feel “up to speed” and
competent when it comes to highly technical deliberations, it
is vital that board members serve long terms. High rates of
turnover and/or short term limits would prevent board mem-
bers from overcoming the informational asymmetries that
leave them chronically vulnerable to bureaucratic discretion.
The absence of term limits also allows HAB members time to
build relationships of trust and respect with agency officials,
8 The urgency of this mandate changes, of course, with different state and
federal administrations.
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particularly at the committee level, where the HAB can exert a
decisive influence on policy.
Stakeholder representation Board members are not just indi-
vidual citizens; they are stakeholder representatives selected
by their constituents to serve on the board. This gives their
voices political weight and credibility: the DOE can reason-
ably expect that board members’ views reflect those of
broader constituencies that might be mobilized if the DOE
neglects their interests. It also helps ensure that (some) board
members will be highly competent and dedicated, and it
prevents the DOE from hand-picking board members who
will simply rubber-stamp its decisions. The fact that the HAB
includes a broad cross-section of different affected interests
also (1) ensures that there will be some board members—
representing environmental NGOs, for example—willing to
take strong, adversarial positions when they feel that public
interests are being neglected, but (2) prevents the DOE from
dismissing the HAB as captured by activist communities that
the DOE could write off as radical and unrepresentative.
This feature of the HABmakes it unlike all of the other site-
specific advisory boards, whose members are individual citi-
zens unconnected to organized constituencies.9 Without such
connections, these other boards can serve only epistemic and
instrumental functions, not the political functions that we have
emphasized above. If advisory boards are to have any chance
of counteracting the problem of bureaucratic domination,
then, stakeholder representation is vital.
Early feedback, informal contact Early-stage consultations
between DOE officials and HAB committees enable the
HAB to intervene early in the DOE decision-making cycle,
making it much more likely to affect DOE policy. This early-
stage feedback is further facilitated by repeated, informal inter-
actions between board members and agency bureaucrats. The
HAB creates space for such interactions, which build long-term
trust andmutual understanding, around its committeemeetings.
Overlapping agency mandates The formal involvement of
EPA and theWashington Dept. of Ecology reduces the danger
that the HAB will be captured by the DOE. The three agen-
cies’ competing and overlapping mandates help check each
others’ discretionary power and opens up space for contesta-
tion and disagreement. Again, public institutions genuinely
interested in public accountability might experiment with
similar models where citizens interact with multiple agencies.
Our research indicates that these several design features help
render the DOE accountable to the public. If the HAB did not
exist, or if it were replaced by an advisory board without its
unique design features, local populations would stand at greater
risk of bureaucratic domination; public health and safety in the
Hanford area would be more vulnerable to neglect.
We should emphasize, however, that we have no desire to
exaggerate the democratic benefits of the HAB. The HAB
remains a small, volunteer organization, and its power to exact
important concessions from the DOE (and its corporate sub-
contractors) is limited. Its political influence, moreover, de-
pends ultimately on the broader public’s willingness and ca-
pacity tomobilize to protect its own interests, or at least threaten
credibly to do so.10 The HAB facilitates such mobilization, but
since it commands no formal power, it cannot serve as a
surrogate for it. Where bureaucratic agencies make complex,
technical decisions that implicate the interests of local popula-
tions, institutions such as the HAB can help make accountabil-
ity possible. But as our analysis throughout this section sug-
gests, they will not achieve accountability on their own.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Interviews
Interview A: EPA official, 12:30 pm, Oct. 12th, 2012.
Interview B: HAB member (also committee chair), 9 am,
June 4th, 2012.
Interview C: HAB member (also committee chair), 2 pm,
June 11th, 2012.
Interview D: DOE official, 10 am, July 6th, 2012.
Interview E: HAB member (also committee chairperson),
4:15 pm, May 22nd, 2012
Interview F: Annette Cary, 11 am, May 23rd, 2012.
Interview G: HAB member, 2:30 pm, September 27th,
2012.
Interview H: EPA official, 3 pm, June 13th, 2012.
Interview I: HAB member (also committee vice-chair),
10 am, March 6th, 2012.
Interview J: DOE official, 1:15 pm, October 5th, 2012.
Interview K: Former HABmember, 2 pm, June 13th, 2012.
Interview L: Washington Dept. of Ecology official, 1 pm,
June 11th, 2012.
Interview M: Washington Dept. of Ecology official,
2:30 pm, Sept. 18th, 2012.
Interview N: HAB Member, 11 am, May 30th, 2012.
9 The Nevada SSAB also includes liaisons that represent institutions and
organizations, but these liaisons are non-voting members.
10 It also depends on elected executives’ willingness to require
meaningful public involvement in agency decision-making; but of
course, this willingness too depends ultimately on the public’s
disposition to demand it.
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Interview O: Follow-up interview with HABmember (also
committee chairperson), 3 pm, November 9th, 2012 (same
interviewee as Interview E).
Interview P: HAB member, 2 pm, February 16th, 2012
Interview Q: HAB Member, 6:30 pm, May 16th, 2012
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